





# Deterioration of the epizootic situation with highly pathogenic avian influenza

## Act of handover of bio-samples collected during mass mortality of poultry in Askania Nova Nature Reserve in 2021


Акт № 2 від 29.03.2021  
про передачу зразків біоматеріалу з Біосферного заповідника «Асканія-Нова» Інституту зоології ім. І.І. Шмальгаузена НАН України

Згідно Договору № 1-2021 про наукове співробітництво між Біосферним заповідником «Асканія-Нова» Інституту зоології ім. І.І. Шмальгаузена НАН України та Інститутом зоології ім. І.І. Шмальгаузена НАН України для проведення паразитологічних досліджень з Біосферного заповідника «Асканія-Нова» Інституту зоології ім. І.І. Шмальгаузена НАН України.

Журнали сражі *Grus grus* L., 1811 – 46 екз.;  
*Oryzopsis latipes* (Temminck, 1825) – 23 екз.;  
*Grus grus* L., 1758 – 32 екз.;  
*Grus grus* L., 1758 – 32 екз.;  
Крижані *Anas platyrhynchos* L., 1758 – 2 екз.;  
Зимові *Buteo lagopus* (Scopoli, 1769) – 1 екз.;  
Гуси *Anas platyrhynchos* (Scopoli, 1769) – 1 екз.;  
Морські качки *Larus cachinnans* (Pallas, 1811) – 2 екз.


Від Біосферного заповідника «Асканія-Нова» НААН  
Сторони науковий співробітник лабораторії обстеження різноманітних диких тварин  
Від Інституту зоології ім. І.І. Шмальгаузена НАН України  
Науковий співробітник відділу паразитології, аскарид біологічного науку

29.03.2021




**'Grus communis, 46 pcs.;  
Tadorna ferruginea, 23;  
Corvus frugilegus, 32;  
Corvus monedula, 22;  
Anas platyrhynchos, 2;  
Buteo lagopus, 1;  
Anser albifrons, 1;  
Larus cachinnans, 2'**

## Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Russia and worldwide (2022)



**In Europe in 2020–2022, the damage amounted to €3,000,000.0**

**In the Russian Federation in 2020–2022, the damage exceeded RUB 4,500,000,000.0, more than 10,000,000 poultry eliminated**



## Human cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (2009–2023)

Country	2003-2009*		2010-2014*		2015-2019*		2020		2021		2022		2023		Total	
	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths
Azerbaijan	8	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	5
Bangladesh	1	0	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	1
Cambodia	9	7	47	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	58	38
Canada	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
China	38	25	9	5	6	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	55	32
Djibouti	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Egypt	90	27	120	50	149	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	359	120
India	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Indonesia	162	134	35	31	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	168
Iraq	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2
Myanmar	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Nepal	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Nigeria	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Pakistan	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
Thailand	25	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	17
Turkey	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
United States of America	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Viet Nam	112	57	15	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	128	64
Total	468	282	233	125	160	48	1	0	2	1	6	1	3	1	873	458

\* 2003-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2019 total figures. Breakdowns by year available on subsequent tables. Total number of cases includes number of deaths. WHO reports only laboratory-confirmed cases. All dates refer to onset of illness. Source: WHO/GIP, data in HQ as of 3 March 2023



## Чрезвычайные ситуации


### Новости о вспышках болезней

Последние новости ВОЗ о вспышках болезней, содержащие информацию о подтвержденных чрезвычайных событиях в области общественного здравоохранения или предполагаемых событиях, вызывающих обеспокоенность.

### Заражение человека вирусом гриппа птиц A(H5N1) – Чили

21 апреля 2023 г.

## Current epizootic situation with highly pathogenic avian influenza in Russia



### Сводные картографические данные хронологии неблагополучия в РФ по особо опасным и экономически значимым болезням животных

**– Высокопатогенный грипп птиц – по данным ВОЗЖ на 18 мая, в 2023-м году зарегистрировано 32 вспышки ВГП в РФ, в т.ч. 5 – среди домашней, 27 – среди дикой и декоративной птицы. На отчетную дату нездоровевшими остаются 29 очагов. Кроме этого, в ВОЗЖ не подана вспышка ВГП в Херсонской области, заболевание выявлено в Биосферном заповеднике Аскания Нова среди страусов.**

**РОССЕЛЬХОЗНАДЗОР**  
Федеральная служба по ветеринарному и фитосанитарному надзору

**МЭР МОСКВЫ**  
РАСПОРЯЖЕНИЕ

17 мая 2023 г., № 283-РМ  
Об установлении ограничительных мероприятий (карантин) на территории города Москвы

В связи с выявлением 16 мая 2023 г. случая заболевания диких птиц высокопатогенным гриппом птиц на территории района Восточное городка Москвы, границах Западного административного округа (с 14 мая 1999 г. № 4978-1-О) административно:

- Ограничить:
  - 1.1. **Эпизоотическим очагом** – территорию земельного участка, ограниченного Бесединским шоссе и земельными участками с кадастровым номерами – 77:05:001:2007:2, 77:05:001:2007:2493, 77:05:001:2007:2073, 77:05:001:2065:57.
  - 1.2. **Угрожаемый зоной** – территорию садоводческих районов города Москвы: Битовое, Кванты, Мартово, Заповое, Песчаное, Москворецкое, Сабурово, Царьково, Восточное, Орехово-Борисово Северное, Орехово-Борисово Южное, Захарово.
  - 1.3. **Зоны наблюдения** – территорию города Москвы, прилегающую к угрожаемой зоне.
- Установить ограничительные мероприятия (карантин) в пределах эпизоотического очага, угрожаемой зоны и зоны наблюдения, указанные в пункте 1 настоящего распоряжения, на срок до выявления мероприятий, направленных на исключение распространения и ликвидации очага высокопатогенного гриппа птиц, предосторожных. Ветеринарные мероприятия осуществляются в соответствии с действующими, ограниченными и иными мероприятиями, установленными иными актами и иными ограничениями, направленными на предотвращение распространения и ликвидации очага высокопатогенного гриппа птиц, утвержденными приказом Министерства сельского хозяйства Российской Федерации от 24 марта 2021 г. № 158 «Об утверждении Ветеринарных правил



# U.S. Biosecurity Strategies

## National Biodefense Strategy (October 2022)

**OBJECTIVES**


Objectives for strengthening the biodefense enterprise approach to countering biological threats and enhancing and detection to inform biodefense enterprise.

**GOAL 3: Ensure biodefense enterprise preparedness to reduce the impacts of bioincidents.**

The United States will take measures to reduce the impacts of bioincidents, including maintaining a vibrant national science and technology base to support biodefense, promoting a strong domestic and international public, veterinary, and plant health infrastructure, developing, updating, and exercising response and recovery capabilities, establishing risk communications, and developing and implementing a national biodefense strategy and implementing a national biodefense strategy.

**GOALS:**

1. Enable risk awareness and detection to inform decision-making across the biodefense enterprise.
2. Ensure biodefense enterprise capabilities to prevent bioincidents.
3. Ensure biodefense enterprise preparedness to reduce the impacts of bioincidents.
4. Rapidly respond to limit the impacts of bioincidents.
5. Facilitate recovery to restore the community, the economy, and the environment after a bioincident.



## U.S. Department of Defense Biomanufacturing Strategy (March 2023)

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
 DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION  
 INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
 CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT  
 ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PRIVACY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND TRANSPARENCY  
 ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
 CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER  
 DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
 DIRECTOR OF RISK ASSESSMENT

21 March 2023

**U.S. Department of Defense Biomanufacturing Strategy**

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

21 March 2023

DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

**... The Department will make substantial investments in support of the strategy, including \$1 billion over five years to catalyze the establishment of a domestic biomanufacturing industrial base, \$270 million over five years for the Tri-Service Biotechnology for a Resilient Supply Chain program, and \$200 million to support biosecurity- and cybersecurity-related efforts...**

**The DoD Biomanufacturing Strategy supports a self-sustaining domestic biomanufacturing ecosystem <...>. Three Principles guide this strategy:**

- 1) The Department will establish transition partners for early-stage innovations (e.g., at Technology Readiness Levels 1-5);
- 2) The Department will develop the field of biomanufacturing through innovations in practice and application; and
- 3) The Department will map the domestic biomanufacturing ecosystem and the changes that occur over time for identification and tracking of metrics to support future implementation and refinement of the DoD Biomanufacturing Strategy.

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The DoD Biomanufacturing Strategy supports a self-sustaining domestic biomanufacturing ecosystem that will mitigate the risk of losing noncritical capabilities DoD adapts, thus preventing new supply chain vulnerabilities. Three principles guide this strategy:

- (1) The Department will establish transition partners for early-stage innovations (e.g., at Technology Readiness Levels 1-5);
- (2) The Department will develop the field of biomanufacturing through innovations in practice and application; and
- (3) The Department will map the domestic biomanufacturing ecosystem and the changes that occur over time for identification and tracking of metrics to support future implementation and refinement of the DoD Biomanufacturing Strategy.

**a. Establish DoD transition partners for biotechnology**

The DoD Biomanufacturing Strategy identifies a number of possible new capabilities. Key



# Expert Community Assessment of Biorisk Associated with U.S. Biological-Military Activities

## Global distribution of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs King's College London Report (Global Biolabs, 2023)



### Global BioLabs Report 2023



#### Chapter 1: New and Updated Trends in Global BSL4 Lab Data

**Key Message:** BSL4 labs are rapidly increasing in number. In 2021, we recorded 59 BSL4 labs in operation, under construction, or planned in 23 countries. By the beginning of 2023, that number had increased by ten to 69 labs. There are 51 BSL4 labs in operation, three under construction, and 15 planned, all spread over 27 countries.

Japan and Singapore have also increased their BSL4 labs in addition to the trend already seen. For the first time, these countries will be shown on the BSL4 lab map. The largest concentration of BSL4 labs continues to be found in Europe, with 24 labs in operation, 2 under construction, and 15 planned. There are 10 BSL4 labs in operation, three under construction, and 15 planned in Asia. There are 2 BSL4 labs in operation, one under construction, and 11 planned in Africa. There are 16 BSL4 labs in operation, one under construction, and 11 planned in North America. There are 4 BSL4 labs in operation, 4 under construction, and 0 planned in Oceania. There are 1 BSL4 lab in operation, 0 under construction, and 1 planned in South America. There are 69 BSL4 labs in operation, 51 under construction, and 18 planned, all spread over 27 countries.





...Key message: BSL4 labs are rapidly increasing in number. In 2021, we identified 59 BSL4 labs that were in operation, under construction, or planned in 23 countries. By the beginning of 2023, that number had increased by ten to 69 labs. There are 51 BSL4 labs in operation, three under construction, and 15 planned, all spread over 27 countries...


Country	Biosafety Implementation	Biosafety Assistance	International Equipment	Biosafety Test Score
Algeria	Training			0
Algeria	Personal Protective Equipment			0
Algeria	Occupational Health			0
Algeria	Inventory			0
Algeria	Transportation Safety			0
Algeria	Decontamination			0
Algeria	Incident Response Plan			0
Algeria	Incident Reporting			0
Algeria	National or Regional Biosafety Association			0
Algeria	Participation on global scale			0
Algeria	National Biosafety Legislation			0
Algeria	National Biosafety Oversight Entity			0
Algeria	National List			0
Algeria	Whistleblower Protections			0
Algeria	Physical Security			0
Algeria	Information and Cyber Security			0
Algeria	Personnel Security			0
Algeria	Biosafety Risk Assessments			0
Algeria	Inventory			0
Algeria	Export Controls			0
Algeria	DNA Sequencing			0
Algeria	Training			0
Algeria	Transportation Security			0
Algeria	Incident Response Plan			0
Algeria	Incident Reporting			0
Algeria	Biosafety Test Score			0
Algeria	BWC, UNCOP, Membership of AIC, OPIBMSI, CBRN APPS, ESEBP, EE			0
Algeria	National Dual Use Legislation			0
Algeria	National Dual Use Research Oversight			0
Algeria	Accession Rating			0
Algeria	Whistleblower Protections			0
Algeria	Self-governance Measures			0
Algeria	Stakeholder Oversight			0
Algeria	Test Bed Test Score			0

Table 1: Global distribution of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs

	BSL-4			BSL-3+			Total
	Per Region	Operational	Planned/Under Construction	Per Region	Operational	Planned/Under Construction	
Europe	26	24	2	21	21	0	47
Asia	20	9	11	10	10	0	30
Africa	3	2	1	2	2	0	5
North America	15	12	3	19	18	1	34
Oceania	4	4	0	1	1	0	5
South America	1	0	1	4	3	1	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>126</b>



## Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (6 February 2023)



### HEALTH SECURITY

**INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC**  
Now entering its fourth year, the COVID-19 pandemic remains one of the most significant threats to global public health. At a cost of more than \$5 trillion from lost and billions of dollars in lost economic output to date. Despite the gradual decline of the most severe health effects of COVID-19 because of the greater availability of vaccines globally, increased natural immunity, and better treatments, significant challenges remain as countries now are responding to new variants, waning vaccine protection, gaps in vaccine coverage, challenges in management of public health safety measures, and growing misinformation campaigns aimed at sowing doubt and discrediting public health institutions worldwide. In addition to direct effects of the pandemic, on human economic, human security, political, and national security, implications of COVID-19 continue to create recovery efforts, preventing both known and unforeseen challenges that probably will ripple through society and the global economy during the next year and for years to come.

'...Countries globally remain vulnerable to the emergence or introduction of a novel pathogen that could cause a devastating new pandemic...'

...A lack of global field biosafety standards and protective measures continues to raise concerns of viral spillover worldwide...'

'...Rapid advances in dual-use technology, including bioinformatics, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and genetic editing, could enable development of novel biological weapons that complicate detection, attribution, and treatment...'

'...New technologies—particularly in the fields of AI and biotechnology—are being developed and are proliferating faster than companies and governments can shape norms, protect privacy, and prevent dangerous outcomes...'

regulatory requirements have all been implicated in contributing to the risk of contamination and/or breaches in biocontainment.

**Our Assessment of the Origins of COVID-19**  
The IC continues to investigate how SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, first infected humans, maintaining a Community of Interest across agencies. All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible explanations for the origin of COVID-19: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.

**BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**  
Global shortwings in preparations for the COVID-19 pandemic and concerns with biosecurity, fabricated public claims about U.S. biological weapons development fueled by U.S. adversaries, as well as continued questions surrounding the origins of the COVID-19 virus, may inspire some adversaries to consider options related to the development of biological weapons.

**ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS**

'...Rapid advances in dual-use technology, including bioinformatics, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and genetic editing, could enable development of novel biological weapons that complicate detection, attribution, and treatment...'

'New technologies—particularly in the fields of AI and biotechnology—are being developed and are proliferating faster than companies and governments can shape norms, protect privacy, and prevent dangerous outcomes...'

'...New technologies—particularly in the fields of AI and biotechnology—are being developed and are proliferating faster than companies and governments can shape norms, protect privacy, and prevent dangerous outcomes...'



# Confirmed Biosecurity Violations in the U.S.

## Publication by The Intercept, a U.S. nonprofit news organization, about biosecurity violations in the U.S.



Experimenting With Disaster Part 1

In America's biolabs, hundreds of accidents have gone undisclosed to the public.



Experimenting With Disaster Part 2

In America's biolabs, hundreds of accidents have gone undisclosed to the public.



Experimenting With Disaster Part 3

In America's biolabs, hundreds of accidents have gone undisclosed to the public.

**'In America's labs, hundreds of accidents have gone undisclosed to the public.'**

**T**HE GRADUATE STUDENT was on a Saturday, handling a mouse. She wore two gowns, two pairs of shoe covers, a hair net, a face mask, and two pairs of gloves. Gingerly, she had pointed the needle at the mouse's abdomen and injected the antibody. The animal was infected with a recombinant strain of Chikungunya virus, a mosquito-borne pathogen that has sparked epidemics in Africa and the Caribbean. Chikungunya can wreak havoc in other regions when the right kind of mosquito is present: in 2007 and 2017 there were outbreaks in Italy, and in 2014 the virus hit Florida, infecting 11 people who had not recently traveled abroad. In January 2016, nine months before the researcher stood in the lab that weekend, a locally acquired infection was diagnosed in Texas.

**A** RESEARCHER WAS SHOOK in the middle of Manhattan, in a lab one block from Central Park's East Meadow. It was the Friday afternoon before Labor Day in 2011, and people were rushing out of the city for a long weekend. Three days earlier, the ferret had been inoculated with a recombinant strain of 1918 influenza, which killed between 20 and 50 million people when it swept through the world at the end of World War I. To prevent it from sparking another pandemic, 1918 influenza is studied under biosafety level 3 conditions, the second-tighest of biosafety controls available. The researcher at Mount Sinai School of Medicine (now Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai) was wearing protective equipment, including two pairs of gloves. But the ferret bit hard enough to pierce through both pairs, breaking the skin of his left thumb.

**I**N THE LAB, THE RESEARCHER HAD A BOLD idea. "Someone convinced me to do something really, really stupid," virologist Ron Fouchier told *Scientific American* in 2011. Fouchier, of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, and another scientist, Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, had separately tweaked the H5N1 virus — an influenza that primarily infects birds — in a way that made it spread more easily in ferrets. H5N1 is a prime pandemic candidate, and ferrets are often used as proxies for humans in flu experiments. When word got out that the two scientists were planning to publish papers detailing their experiments, making a blueprint available to the world, the outcry was extreme. The scientists were trying to better understand H5N1 in order to prevent a pandemic, but critics worried that their experiments could instead cause one — or provide would-be bioterrorists with an outbreak manufacturing guide.

The Intercept

- In 2013, a researcher at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas, pricked their finger while drawing blood from a chicken infected with H5N1 avian influenza. The scientist had handed a used syringe to an assistant while trying to get a better grasp of the chicken's jugular vein. The assistant returned it needle side out, piercing through the scientist's gloves. The researcher was prescribed Tamiflu for one week and told to immediately report a fever. Kansas State University did not respond to a request to comment.
- Between April 2013 and March 2014, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported five mouse escapes, including one of an animal that had been infected with SARS four days earlier. In a letter to NIH, a biosafety specialist argued that the frequency of escapes was due to the "complex research taking place at our institute" rather than a failure of training, noting that several teams at the university use a breed of transgenic mouse known for its unpredictable behavior. After the SARS-infected mouse darted under lab equipment, researchers cornered it with a broom and returned it to its cage. The University of North Carolina did not respond to a request to comment.

The Intercept

- In 2018, a researcher at the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research in Silver Spring, Maryland, contracted a MRSA infection, a condition that can become severe if left untreated, after working with the antibiotic-resistant bacteria MRSA in the lab. The researcher could not recall any mishaps that would have led to infection, a situation that experts say is common with laboratory-acquired infections. The FDA center did not respond to a request to comment.
- In early 2020, amid the shortage in respirators and masks brought on by the pandemic, a lab at Tufts University conducted low-risk experiments with the H3N2 flu virus without proper equipment. A student spilled a test tube containing a small amount of virus, potentially exposing five people. None were initially wearing masks. (Two later put them on to clean up the spill.) H3N2 is a seasonal flu virus and not considered a dangerous pathogen, but in an email to Tufts, an administrator at NIH highlighted a series of omission and errors. These included the lab's failure to provide personal protective equipment, a lack of proper safety signage, and the failure of researchers to seek appropriate medical care after being exposed to the virus. The NIH administrator also recommended that the principal investigator be retrained. Tufts declined to comment.

## Publications about biosecurity violations at Fort Detrick on the website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Germany and the Chinese newspaper China Daily



Home | Themen > Bekämpfung COVID-19

Full text: Doubtful Points about Fort Detrick (USAMRIID) 2021-11-09 18:36

The full text of the two papers entitled "Doubtful Points about Fort Detrick (U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases)"... Fort Detrick, where the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) is located, is the center of U.S. bio-safety activities and activities for an illegal, non-transparent and unsafe practices. Serious concerns have long been raised by the international community over U.S. activities at Fort Detrick, in particular about USAMRIID, and there are many doubtful points about its connection with COVID-19.



Full text: Doubtful Points about Fort Detrick (USAMRIID) Xinhua | Updated: 2021-08-26 08:17




Personnel work in the biosafety level-4 laboratory at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in 2002. (OLIVIER DOULIER/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE)

**'...In 2009, U.S. officials discovered during inspections that many of the pathogens being studied at the institute had not been entered into the laboratory's database, after which they suspended some of its research. <...> During CDC inspections at the USAMRIID laboratory in June 2019, serious irregularities were found. The CDC then closed the laboratory <...>. After the labs were closed, there were outbreaks of respiratory disease in nearby communities...'**

## Publication on U.S. WUSF's website about the Fort Detrick leak



Did a military lab spill anthrax into public waterways? Book reveals details of a US leak



**"...On the morning of 25 May 2018, an overpressure occurred at a sterilisation facility in a waste tank from the USAMRIID laboratory at Fort Detrick working with deadly pathogens, causing the unsterilised substance to spill out..."**

## The New York Times publication on biosecurity breaches at Fort Detrick

The New York Times  
**Deadly Germ Research Is Shut Down at Army Lab Over Safety Concerns**



Problems with disposal of dangerous materials led the government to suspend research at the military's leading biodefense center.



## NAMRU-3 military biolab moves to Italy

l'ANTIDIPLOMATICO  
LIBERI DI SVELARVI IL MONDO



EUROPA 12 Settembre 2022 14:00

## I BIOLABORATORI MILITARI TRASLOCANO E UNO È GIÀ A CASA "NOSTRA"

Il segreto che avvolge i biolaboratori americani permette di trasferirli nel silenzio generale anche in paesi come l'Italia. Nel dicembre 2019 ad esempio era iniziato il complesso

'...The secrecy surrounding American laboratories allows them to be reduced to widespread quiet, even in nations like Italy...'

Si tratta di un'unità, tra le maggiori del suo genere, che ha il compito di "studiare, monitorare ed individuare minacce sanitarie emergenti e riemergenti di importanza militare e

'...the transfer took place in 2020 in the midst of a 'COVID emergency,' so it is highly suspicious that there was no story about this lab if, on paper, its purpose was to study health threats...'

L'importanza e le dimensioni di questa struttura, pur se situata in una base militare fuori dalla giurisdizione italiana, avrebbero imposto al governo di informare i cittadini, ma tutto ciò non è avvenuto. Non dimentichiamo che questo

trasferimento ha avuto luogo nel 2020 in piena "emergenza Covid", risulta quindi oltremodo sospetto che non si sia colta l'occasione per parlare di questo laboratorio se, sulla carta, aveva come obiettivo proprio lo studio delle minacce sanitarie.

...che l'ora di...  
importante...  
dichiarato...  
Montev...  
non impo...

'...while the entire country was under lockdown, officially to 'protect the health of Italians,' an American military biolab arrived in Sigonella, of which nothing was known...'

'...The importance and size of this structure, even if it were on a military base outside Italian jurisdiction, would have required the government to inform the citizens, but it did not...'

Così, mentre l'intero paese veniva messo in lockdown, ufficialmente per "proteggere la salute degli italiani", arrivava a Sigonella un biolaboratorio militare americano del quale non si doveva sapere nulla. Esiste pure un comunicato... ma i nostri

NEWS | Dec. 12, 2019  
By Cmdr Dean J. Wagner, executive officer of NAMRU-3

## Reaction of the residents of Pesaro on construction of biolabs

CentroPagina  
Cronaca e Attualità

## Biolaboratorio sperimentale a Pesaro, presentato il ricorso al presidente della Repubblica

'Experimental Biolab in Pesaro, Address to the President of Italy'.

L'associazione ne spiega i motivi. «Il Comune di Pesaro ha fatto un confronto competitivo tra offerenti - regola che non è derogabile neppure per l'ipotesi in cui la vendita corra tra enti pubblici. In ogni caso, e forse ancor più gravemente, non ha fatto stimare il valore dell'area, sicché ha accettato il prezzo proposto da Istituto Zooprofilattico senza alcun approfondimento. Oltre a rendere invalida la delibera, questi vizi portano alla responsabilità avanti la Corte dei Conti di tutti i consiglieri che hanno votato a favore della vendita. Inoltre, gli uffici comunali avevano subordinato il loro parere favorevole al fatto che il laboratorio e le stalle non fossero industrie insalubri di prima classe e, invece, secondo costante giurisprudenza, sono inclusi tra le lavorazioni insalubri di prima classe».



Pesaro, residenti di Torraccia: "No al Biolaboratorio" <https://youtu.be/65pPS4QlcTl>

Marco Palangi, a resident of the Torraccia district (a suburb of Pesaro) said in an interview: 'In these kinds of biolaboratories they bring healthy animals, subject them to artificial infection with a virus, and then experiment on them in order to produce a vaccine, which, in his opinion, is unacceptable behavior towards animals'.

ATTUALITÀ PESARO

## Laboratorio sperimentale a Pesaro, il comitato pronto all'esposto. «Pericoloso per uomini e animali»

I cittadini si sono riuniti in assemblea e hanno raccolto oltre 1.000 firme. «Potrà eseguire esperimenti su animali (in vivo) o su cellule (in vitro) e manipolare virus»

Luigi Benelli - 8 Gennaio 2023

'Experimental Laboratory in Pesaro, committee ready for exhibition. "Dangerous to people and animals".'



La riunione del comitato

## affaritaliani.it 26 ANNI Biolaboratorio, livello sicurezza 3 a Pesaro. La paura di un'altra Wuhan...

Pesaro proteste dei cittadini per la creazione in città di un laboratorio di bio-sicurezza (BSL3), un gradino sotto quello di Wuhan al centro del Sars Cov 2

di Antonio Amorosi



Laboratorio sperimentale di Bio sicurezza a Pesaro nelle Marche. Il Comune del sindaco Matteo Ricci ha approvato la vendita del terreno per il progetto

Il Comune di Pesaro ha autorizzato la vendita di un terreno pubblico per "la creazione di un laboratorio di bio-sicurezza (BSL3)" a cura "dell'Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell'Umbria e delle Marche "Togo Rosati". Nella delibera il Comune spiega cosa si intenda per laboratorio di bio-sicurezza BSL3: "ossia una struttura in grado di garantire sperimentazioni e manipolazioni, in vivo e in vitro, di agenti virali pericolosi per la salute animale e

'Biolab, BSL-3 security level in Pesaro. Fear of Another Wuhan'

# Involvement of Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in implementation of military-biological programmes in Ukraine

**WRAIR** Walter Reed Army Institute of Research  
Defense Health • Global Health

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and the U.S. Army Medical Research Units

## Creating a global biological monitoring system

**EIDSS** Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System

**Terms of Reference**  
Introduction of the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) and the Pathogen Asset Control System (PACS) in Ukraine.

**1.1 Background**  
On 29 August 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Ukrainian Ministry of Health signed the Biological Threat Reduction Implementing Agreement (BTRIA) under the terms of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreement. The overall purpose of the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) in Ukraine is to prevent the proliferation of radioactive, pathogenic, and expertise that could be used in the development of biological weapons by preventing the unauthorized acquisition, development, production, and use of such weapons.

**1.2 Objective**  
EIDSS version 2.0 strengthens and supports monitoring and prevention of human and animal diseases, including especially dangerous infections, by integrating human and veterinary case plus disease specific investigation, aggregate disease data collection for non-stored based information analysis capabilities. The development of EIDSS is based on cutting edge expertise from institutes such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), and others.

**1.3 Objective**  
EIDSS is a distributed database system with a laboratory consisting of four...

**...Establish a nationwide disease surveillance and reporting system...**

**...The development of EIDSS is based on cutting edge expertise from institutes such as ... Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)...**

## Training for Ukrainian specialists

**BTRP Train-the-Trainer Program Meeting**  
January 27-29, 2009

**Day 1: Leadership meeting**  
**Day 2 and Day 3: Working Group Meeting**

**Objective:** To identify the requirements and needs of Ministry of Health for BTR training and to develop a strategic framework for BTR training program implementation activities.

**Proposed participants:**

**Ministry of Health of Ukraine:**

- Ludmila Malahova - Deputy Director of Department on State Sanitary Control, Chief of Department on Epidemiology (WRAIR)
- Andriy Benekha - Director of the Department on Personnel Policy, Education, and Science (WRAIR)
- Oleksandr Volynets - Deputy Director of the Department on Personnel Policy, Education, and Science (WRAIR)
- Zhanna Tselisnik - Head of the International Cooperation and Eurointegration Department (WRAIR)
- Mariya Avakyan - Rector of the National Medical University of D. Bubokhova (WRAIR)
- Varya Vorobeyko - Rector of the National Medical Academy of Post-Graduate Education of P. L. Shupchik (WRAIR)
- Lubov Melnikova - Chief Sanitary Doctor of CES (WRAIR)
- Sergiy Postoyakov - Director, I. I. Mechnikov Ukrainian Research and Practice Institute (WRAIR)
- Valeria Saha - Deputy Chief Doctor, CES (WRAIR)
- Andriy Prokhorov - Director, I. I. Mechnikov Institute of Ecology and Pathology (WRAIR)
- Andriy Kuznetsov - International Relations Director, National Medical Academy of Post-Graduate Education P. L. Shupchik (WRAIR)

**US Subject Matter Experts and Back and Vetsch:**

- Matthew Walker - General Director, Black and Veatch
- Andrew Barth - Superintendent, Training Manager, Black and Veatch
- Mary Guffin - Science Integrator, Black and Veatch
- Joseph Fay - Chief Science and Technology, Black and Veatch
- Natalia Orlov - Training Integrator, Black and Veatch
- Bernard L. Snek - Epidemiologist, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
- Carroll Clark - Epidemiologist, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
- Robert J. Lipnick - Director, Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
- Troy R. Sporester - Public Health Epidemiologist, Threat Reduction Support Center

**Day 1 Agenda**

Time	Registration	Activity
9:45 - 10:00	Registration	Registration and Welcome
10:00 - 10:15	Registration	BTRP Train the Trainer Concept Discussion
10:15 - 10:45	Registration	Outline of Strategic Issues
10:45 - 11:00	Registration	Discussion of Training Requirements of WRAIR
11:00 - 13:00	Registration	Lunch
13:00 - 14:00	Registration	Designation of Working Group

**...Robert Lipnick - Director, Epidemiology and Biostatistics, U.S. Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)...**

## Study of tick-borne encephalitis, West Nile fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever and tularemia pathogens, and other diseases (UP-1 Project)

**Clinical Protocol**  
A seroprevalence study of prior exposure to select arthropod-borne infections in western Ukraine.

**Statistician: Danielle Clark, MPH, Division of Preventive Medicine, WRAIR...**

**'Phenotypic and genotypic characterization of antibiotic resistance in military hospital-associated bacteria from war injuries in the Eastern Ukraine conflict between 2014 and 2020'**

**Journal of Hospital Infection**  
Volume 112, June 2021, Pages 69-76

**Phenotypic and genotypic characterization of antibiotic resistance in military hospital-associated bacteria from war injuries in the Eastern Ukraine conflict between 2014 and 2020**

**...B.T. Jones, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)...**

**...Blood samples will be obtained from approximately 815 people in a population survey. Samples can be tested for antibodies against the following potentially arthropod-borne infections: spotted fever and typhus group Rickettsia, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF), tick-borne encephalitis (TBE), Q fever, tularemia, West Nile fever virus (WNV), Lyme disease, Babesia spp., Leishmania spp., and Bartonella. Participants will also complete a questionnaire identifying their demographic, history of clinical symptoms, and possible risk factors for exposure to these infections. Samples will be tested at either the LWR Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene (LREIH) or the Central Sanitary Epidemiological Station (CES) Laboratory and stored for possible future testing. The results of this study will establish baseline disease prevalence estimates for these infections among rural populations in the region.**

## Creation of a system of continuous monitoring of the epidemic process of especially dangerous diseases (UP-2 project)

**...Partner is Gavin Brownstein (PhD), Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)...**

**...Project Supervisor - Mr. Troy Baker, U.S. DoD/Defense Threat Reduction Agency**

**Address: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)...**

**PARTNER PROJECT AGREEMENT STCU P363 / DTRA UP-2**

between  
U.S. Department of Defense Threat Reduction Agency/Biological Threat Reduction Project,  
the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine  
and  
Central Sanitary Epidemiological Station  
Lviv Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene

Kyiv

Operative Commencement Date: \_\_\_\_\_