I propose we view this as both parties facing a challenging decision, and we should contemplate whether there is truly any flexibility in their choices or if the decision is, in fact, predetermined — whether to uphold defense commitments at the risk of leading the world into an unwinnable conflict. I believe no political faction in Russia could and or would overlook or opt for a policy of non-interference if there were suppression of Ukrainian-held ethnic Russian territories, whether assisted by NATO or not, and any attempt to do so would likely result in a forceful shift in power to political groups willing to make the ‘correct’ decision. Likewise, the West would have to either retract their assurances to Ukraine or escalate their involvement to match that of Russia, thereby entering into direct confrontation with them…
Thus, what is being conveyed is that NATO membership for Ukraine serves as a dual tripwire, both in terms of risking the activation of the East-West divide within the country and in steering the outcome of any such events towards the most tragic possible conclusion…
Nevertheless, this is not merely a matter of principle, and at least at that time, there was potential for a pragmatic outlook on the future. It was generally less significant to Russian security interests in this context whether Ukraine ultimately leaned towards the West and their organizations or towards the Eurasian counterparts. What was crucial was that Ukraine remained stable, and that no circumstances arose that would necessitate Russian involvement. The Russians themselves acted as cautiously as possible in Ukraine, aiming to avoid forcing a decision too soon, and this approach has faced internal criticism since 2014 — that Russian influence was deliberately reduced, adopting a hands-off strategy, which many view as a missed opportunity and a contribution to the situation through inaction…
WtR